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I. Introduction 
After twenty years of scholarly inquiry into the discipline we call “oil 
and gas” law, it appears many of the flaws associated with this 
“specialized” body of law relate to its “special” status. Jurisprudential flaws 
have developed as courts depart from basic contract, property, or tort law in 
pursuit of “oil and gas law” concepts. The phenomenon is not limited to oil 
and gas law but can occur in any “law of” setting. For example, consider 
the debate presently occurring over the extent to which contract law will 
govern the law of electronic commerce.1 At least with electronic commerce 
a conscious debate is taking place over whether there is a need to avoid or 
change basic contract law principles to accommodate particular types of 
transactions.2 It appears such a debate never took place with regard to many 
basic “oil and gas law” principles. This article is designed to trigger such a 
debate by analyzing recent judicial approaches to recognizing and applying 
“implied covenants” under the oil and gas lease. By comparing the 
experience and outcomes under the oil and gas rule with the outcome under 
a contract law analysis, it should be possible to evaluate whether a spe-
cialized “oil and gas” rule is necessary or advisable. 
II. Judicial Reluctance to Apply Basic Legal Concepts 
Once the law associated with an industry is able to anoint itself with 
“law of” status, courts become gun-shy at applying basic principles of 
contract, property, and tort law to the industry’s problems. They proceed 
gingerly with their legal analysis, careful to pay homage to the special “law 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Judge Easterbrook, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997), takes an accommodating approach toward computer 
marketing practices, arguably at the expense of traditional contract principles. Judge 
Easterbrook’s “law of” approach can be contrasted with Judge Vratil’s approach in Klocek v. 
Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000), where she refuses to disregard basic 
contract doctrine to accommodate Gateway’s mass marketing techniques. 
 2. Witness the American Law Institute’s rejection of the final draft of the proposed 
Article 2B to the Uniform Commercial Code and the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws’ adoption of the Uniform Computer Information Transfer Act. See 
generally Symposium, Perspectives on the Uniform Laws Revision Process, 52 HASTINGS 
L.J. 603 (2001). 
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of” principles, lest they be chided for their lack of insight into the unique, 
often complex, analysis that has been applied by others. This is particularly 
the case with oil and gas law which has been blessed with three highly 
influential multi-volume treatises,3 two “oil and gas law” casebooks,4 many 
single-topic treatises,5 several regional oil and gas works,6 and three major 
organizations dedicated to assisting the rest of the world in understanding 
what we are talking about.7 Courts often preface their analysis of an oil and 
gas problem with an observation acknowledging, sometimes grudgingly, 
sometimes apologetically, that it is governed by “oil and gas law.” It is as 
though the court is about to leave the world of law and enter into the nether 
world of quasi-law. A recent example from Kansas is found in Justice Six’s 
                                                                                                                 
 3. EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (1987). First published in 
1904, this is a seven-volume treatise currently maintained by Professors Owen L. Anderson, 
Ernest E. Smith, David E. Pierce, and John S. Lowe. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. 
MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW (2001). This eight-volume treatise, commonly known as 
“Williams & Meyers on Oil & Gas Law,” is now updated and revised by Professors Patrick 
H. Martin and Bruce M. Kramer; volume 8 of the treatise is also published separately as 
WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (10th ed. 1997). W.L. SUMMERS, THE 
LAW OF OIL AND GAS (1954). First published in 1927, this eight volume treatise is now 
maintained by Professor John S. Lowe. Three significant single-volume oil and gas works 
include: RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (3d ed. 1991); JOHN S. LOWE, 
OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL (4th ed. 2002); ROBERT E. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF OIL 
AND GAS LAW (1955). 
 4. JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW (4th ed. 2002); 
RICHARD C. MAXWELL ET AL., OIL AND GAS CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2002). 
 5. E.g., BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND 
UNITIZATION (3d ed. 2002). 
 6. E.g., DAVID E. PIERCE, KANSAS OIL AND GAS HANDBOOK (1986). 
 7. The Center for American and International Law (formerly the Southwestern Legal 
Foundation) publishes the annual proceedings of the Institute on Oil and Gas Law and 
Taxation, which currently consists of a fifty-three-volume reference work. Their web 
address is http:// www.cailaw.org/iel. The Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 
publishes the annual proceedings of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute, which 
currently consists of a forty-eight-volume reference work. The Foundation also conducts 
several special institutes that focus on discrete topics, such as the “Special Institute on 
Private Oil and Gas Royalties.” The Foundation’s publications can be accessed in hard copy 
or by CD Rom, which provides various search capabilities. Their web address is 
http://www.rmmlf.org. The Energy and Mineral Law Foundation (formerly the Eastern 
Mineral Law Foundation) publishes the annual proceedings of the Eastern Mineral Law 
Institute, which currently consists of a twenty-three-volume reference work. Their web 
address is http://www.emlf.org. Each of these nonprofit organizations is dedicated to 
providing education concerning legal issues associated with the mineral and energy 
industries. 
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opinion for the court in Smith v. Amoco Production Co.,8 where he begins 
his analysis with the statement, 
We identify the unique character of oil and gas jurisprudence as 
the cardinal thread in our analysis of the statute of limitations 
question. Implied covenants in oil and gas leases and 
government regulation of the gas industry have historically been 
litigated, discussed in texts, and debated by scholars. One result 
has been the development of a body of law that recognizes 
implied covenants in an oil and gas lease as either implied in fact 
or implied in law.9 
However, as noted in the following section, the court ultimately applies 
basic contract law principles and effectively addresses one of the most 
complex “oil and gas law” issues in a fair and efficient manner—relying, to 
a large extent, on basic contract principles. 
III. The Oil and Gas Lease and the Law of Implied Covenants 
A. Professor Merrill’s “Oil and Gas Law” Analysis 
1. Implying Obligations to Get the Lessor a Better Deal 
The best example of the modern disconnect between contract law and oil 
and gas law is the so-called “law of” implied covenants. We owe much of 
the credit, or blame, for this disconnect to Professor Maurice Merrill who, 
in 1926, published the first edition of his work: The Law Relating to 
Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases.10 Much of Professor Merrill’s 
work was influenced by his underlying belief that the oil and gas lease, as 
written, was an unfair bargain that needed to be mitigated by courts 
implying contract terms as a matter of law.11 The ultimate goal was to get 
                                                                                                                 
 8. 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001). 
 9. Id. at 264 (emphasis added). 
 10. MAURICE H. MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS 
LEASES (1926) (2d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1964). It would surely be a matter of personal delight 
to Professor Merrill that over seventy-five years after he first published his work on implied 
covenants, courts, litigants, and scholars are still actively debating his theories. 
 11. Professor Merrill stated his basic rationale for implied covenants: 
 In the first place, it is to be noted that the landowner, the lessor, is, in almost 
every case, a private individual of limited financial capacity, generally a 
farmer. The expense and uncertainty involved in the search for and exploitation 
of oil and gas render it impossible for him to develop his lands himself. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . But, may not the lessor protect himself by the insertion of general 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/8
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the lessor a better bargain than the express terms of the lease would 
otherwise allow. He made no excuses for his willingness to ride roughshod 
over the law of contract: “Of course, the implied covenant is a fiction, used 
like other fictions by the law in order to achieve a desirable result. . . . The 
obligations are imposed, not by the agreement of the parties, but by 
operation of law.”12 In his treatise, Professor Merrill advocates a “radical” 
departure from basic contract and property law concepts to create a special 
body of “oil and gas law” to protect lessors: 
May there not be, in the conditions peculiar to the oil and gas 
industry and to the leases executed for the purposes of that 
industry, circumstances affecting the relation of “lessor” and 
“lessee” which justify the somewhat radical departures from 
ordinary rules which have characterized the decisions upon the 
implication of covenants?13 
                                                                                                                 
covenants for exploration, development, operation and protection, similar to 
those which the courts imply? The answer to this objection is twofold: In the 
first place, the leases are not drawn by the lessor, nor de novo for each 
transaction. They are taken upon standard forms, prepared by the lessees or 
with a view to their special interests. If special terms are to be inserted, they 
must be demanded by the lessor. But the ordinary lessor, not versed in the 
peculiarities of oil and gas, nor yet in the rules of law which govern the 
liabilities of lessees, may not know what clauses are necessary for his 
protection, nor how to draw them if he knew of their necessity. . . . Since the 
lease is prepared by the lessee or from the point of view of his interests, since 
the lessor does not ordinarily know what provisions are necessary for enforcing 
the operations the promise of which is held out to him by the lease, and since 
the utter impossibility of foreseeing all of the conditions which may surround 
the lease in the future cuts off all chance of phrasing express provisions to meet 
the demands of these conditions, the lessor’s opportunity to protect himself by 
exact stipulation is illusory. It must be borne in mind that lessor and lessee do 
not usually deal on an equal footing, as two business men contracting at arms 
length. The lessor is ordinarily of limited education and business experience, 
unfamiliar with the subject-matter of the lease. The parties do not, by mutual 
negotiation, arrive at an agreement as to terms, the result of which is embodied 
in a written instrument whose language is an [sic] much that of one party as of 
the other. The lessee comes armed with a printed form, the product of legal and 
business experience, and gives the lessor the chance of accepting that or 
nothing. It is idle to suggest that the lessor can afford himself any adequate 
protection through haggling over terms. 
MERRILL, supra note 10, at 466, 467–68 (2d ed. 1940). 
 12. Id. at 27. 
 13. Id. at 465 (emphasis added). 
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Litigants are presently using Professor Merrill’s implied covenant theory 
in an effort to improve the lessor’s position under the royalty clause of the 
oil and gas lease. For example, the lessors in Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, 
Inc.14 asserted their lessee had an implied obligation “to obtain the best 
price available for the benefit of the royalty owner”15 relying upon the 
theory that “the entire body of implied covenant law has been aimed at . . . 
making sure the royalty owner gets the best deal.”16 In Smith v. Amoco 
Production Co.17 the plaintiffs also put forth a “best price” theory and 
argued “it is illogical to say that the express royalty provisions override the 
lessee’s implied duties.”18 “They reason that setting aside a duty to obtain 
the best price possible eliminates the duty of good faith and fair dealing and 
the implied covenant to market.”19 In a recent article, written by a promi-
nent lawyer who represents royalty owners in class actions, the “best deal” 
theory is taken even further by advocating what the author calls the “mutual 
benefit implied covenant.”20 His “mutual benefit implied covenant” is 
designed to get the lessor not only the “best deal” under the oil and gas 
                                                                                                                 
 14. 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001). 
 15. Id. at 373. 
 16. Id. at 374 (quoting Royalty Owners at oral argument). The Texas Supreme Court re-
jected the lessors’ “best deal” argument relying upon the express “market value” basis for 
calculating royalty and declining to “rewrite this lease’s plain terms to give the Royalty 
Owners the benefit of a bargain they never made.” Id. 
 17. 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001). 
 18. Id. at 270. This suggests, incorrectly, that the “implied” can somehow override that 
which is “express” in the contract. Although this may be the impact when the covenant is 
implied in law, note that it is plaintiff’s counsel who is also arguing the covenant is implied 
in fact. 
 19. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court rejected this argument noting under prior law “the 
lessee has an obligation to market the produced minerals at reasonable terms within a 
reasonable time following production.” Id. at 271. 
 20. John Burritt McArthur, The Mutual Benefit Implied Covenant for Oil and Gas 
Royalty Owners, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 795 (2001). Another reason counsel for lessors like 
the “implied” covenant concept is it provides them with a theory that directs the court’s 
attention away from individual contract rights towards generic concepts of what might be 
“more fair” if the parties were starting anew—unburdened by things like existing contract 
language. This is critical for the new breed of entrepreneurial counsel seeking their next 
class action investment opportunity. Because there are often significant substantive 
differences among oil and gas contracts, the implied covenant theory is often employed to 
try to homogenize the contracts into one obligation and to try and satisfy the requirements 
for class action treatment. This process of contract homogenization typically results in the 
taking away of contract rights from some and conferring new rights on others. This appears 
to be one area where the procedural expediency of the class action is achieved only by 
altering the substantive rights of the parties subject to the class action. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/8
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lease, but also the best deal under any other venture the lessor may be able 
to associate with the oil or gas that is extracted from the leased land. His 
opening statement and foundational premise are pure Merrill: “One of the 
best-settled rules in oil and gas law is that courts give royalty owners extra 
contract protection in order to equalize the balance of power between the 
royalty owner and the lessee, which usually is an operating oil and gas 
company.”21 
Although Merrill’s theory has had some impact on courts,22 only the 
Colorado Supreme Court,23 to date, appears to have adopted wholesale the 
Merrill approach to lease interpretation, or anti-interpretation.24 The Kansas 
Supreme Court, in Smith v. Amoco Production Co., commented on the lack 
of judicial support for Professor Merrill’s theory: 
 Professor Merrill is the advocate for the implied in law 
approach. . . . 
 . . . . 
 The Indian Territory court observed in 1941 that it had found 
no support for Professor Merrill’s implied in law doctrine in the 
adjudicated cases. Sixty years later, based on the briefing here, 
we share the same observation. We choose to join Oklahoma, 
Texas, and Montana in holding that the covenants are implied in 
fact.25 
2. Evaluating the Underlying Premises for Professor Merrill’s Theory 
Professor Merrill’s perceived need for “oil and gas law” to rescue lessors 
from their oil and gas lease bargains can be summarized as follows: (1) 
Lessors are generally less sophisticated than lessees concerning oil and gas 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Id. at 797. 
 22. E.g., Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602, 607 (Kan. 1964) (quoting Professor 
Merrill’s version of the marketable product rule). 
 23. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001). Although the West 
Virginia Supreme Court came to a Rogers-like conclusion in Wellman v. Energy Resources, 
Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2001), the decision is of limited value because the court did not 
have to address the impact of the “at the well” or “market value” language of the oil and gas 
lease. See David E. Pierce, Recent Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: 
Unfinished Business, 53 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 3-1, 3-27 to 3-28 (2002) 
[hereinafter Unfinished Business] (discussing the Wellman case). 
 24. The Rogers case and its use of Professor Merrill’s analysis are discussed in David E. 
Pierce, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to Market, 48 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 10-1 (2002) [hereinafter Jurisprudential Underpinnings]. 
 25. Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255, 268 (Kan. 2001) (citation omitted). 
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development and legal issues; (2) lessees generally begin the negotiating 
process by tendering a printed form of oil and gas lease; (3) the form 
contains provisions generally favorable to the lessee; and (4) lessors often 
do not negotiate the lease terms.26 These same observations could be made 
about many typical contracting situations; but courts have not abandoned 
basic contract law principles when there is inequality of sophistication or 
bargaining power. 
Even in the oil and gas context courts have been unwilling to openly 
redraft the oil and gas lease to benefit the lessor. For example, in the 
leading case on implied covenants the Eighth Circuit in Brewster v. Lanyon 
Zinc Co.27 interpreted an oil and gas lease that expressly gave the lessee a 
period of five years in which to decide whether it would drill a well on the 
property. When the lessor sought to attack the lease because no well had 
been drilled during the first four years, the court responded by quoting the 
following statement by the Kansas Supreme Court in Rose v. Lanyon Zinc 
Co.,28 
“If plaintiffs should desire to contract for an immediate 
exploration, they must have that right; and if they should desire 
to give an oil or gas company five years in which to sink a well, 
upon a consideration satisfactory to themselves, and as the result 
of negotiations free from imposition and fraud, they must have 
that right. But, having deliberately made a contract of the latter 
description, they have no right to call upon a court to declare 
that it is the other kind, merely because generally it might seem 
to be better for farmers not to incumber their lands with mineral 
leases, giving a long time for exploration, or because generally 
such leases do contemplate that forfeiture shall follow a failure 
to explore at once.”29 
In refusing to modify the express terms of the oil and gas lease, the court in 
Brewster, quoting from Justice Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, observed, 
“[E]very person who is not from his peculiar condition or 
circumstances under disability is entitled to dispose of his 
property in such manner and upon such terms as he chooses; and 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 27. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905). 
 28. 74 P. 625 (Kan. 1903). 
 29. Brewster, 140 F. at 808 (quoting Justice Burch, writing for the court in Rose v. 
Lanyon Zinc Co., 74 P. 625, 628 (1903)) (emphasis added). 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/8
2017]        The Renaissance of Oil and Gas Law 523 
 
 
whether his bargains are wise and discreet, or profitable or 
unprofitable, or otherwise, are considerations, not for courts of 
justice, but for the party himself to deliberate upon.”30 
Although Professor Merrill’s observations concerning the leasing 
process may be accurate in some cases,31 they will not be accurate in many 
cases. For example, what if the landowner is represented by counsel 
knowledgeable in “oil and gas law”? What if the landowner entering into 
the oil and gas lease is in fact a sophisticated oil and gas developer who 
negotiated the lease terms, which are contained in a customized document, 
with provisions uniquely beneficial to the land-owner/lessor? Professor 
Merrill responded to this situation in the 1964 Supplement to his treatise: 
Obviously, the implied covenant doctrine is not rendered 
inapplicable merely because in a particular instance the factors 
which justify its imposition as an incident of the relation do not 
exist.32 It would impede the administration of justice if the courts 
were required in each case to embark upon a calculation of the 
relative knowledge and of the bargaining power of the parties. 
Thus the doctrine applies though the lessor is the government or 
a large corporation.33 
Professor Merrill would place ease of administration, to achieve his goals, 
above giving effect to the individual contract of the parties. Basic public 
policy favoring freedom of contract, and the protection of private 
property—in this case contract rights are the price Professor Merrill is 
willing to pay, in the “oil and gas” context, to provide the lessor with a 
better deal. 
Professor Merrill’s premise that oil and gas leases are some sort of 
adhesion contract is also false. Although it is true that oil and gas leases 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 806 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 
244, 239–40 (12th ed. 1877)). 
 31. I would submit that timing of the leasing transaction often has a lot to do with 
whether the lessor will drive a harder bargain for their land. Those who lease first often 
accept the lessee’s offered terms. Those who delay often gain insight from those who have 
gone before them while competition for leases generally increases for those not willing to 
accept the first offer. Also, the existence of prior development in the area being leased can 
be a big factor. Second and third generation development of an area frequently produces a 
corps of savvy landowners schooled through past experiences that were either good, or bad. 
 32. If Professor Merrill’s implied-in-law covenant is based upon the existence of certain 
inequities, why should it be applied if those inequities do not exist? 
 33. MERRILL, supra note 10, at 227 (Supp. 1964) (emphasis added). 
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create a standard relationship, have their own unique structure and 
terminology,34 and are frequently presented to lessors using form 
documents, the relative circumstances of the contracting parties often defy 
classification as an adhesion contract. For example, it is the prospective 
lessor, as the owner of the minerals, who has the “take-it-or-leave-it” power 
over the transaction. They cannot be compelled to lease their land on terms 
demanded by the lessee. In any event, lessees rarely present their offers to 
lease on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Frequently there are other lessees in the 
area willing to negotiate.35 However, the same lessees are not going to 
negotiate against themselves if the landowner accepts the offered deal. This 
is not all that different from a sale of real estate. If the buyer doesn’t offer 
less money, the seller will get their price. 
From my independent analysis, the prototypical leasing transaction 
Professor Merrill uses to justify judicial intervention is not, in fact, the 
typical situation. On several occasions I have had the opportunity to 
conduct empirical research that involved analyzing either a sampling of oil 
and gas leases held by a lessee in a county or state, or all the oil and gas 
leases used by a lessee in a single field. For example, I designed and 
conducted a study of oil and gas leases used by the Union Pacific Resources 
                                                                                                                 
 34. As I have written previously, 
The development of oil and gas in America is accomplished through a standard 
relationship created by documents called oil and gas leases. It has become 
axiomatic there is no such thing as a standard oil and gas lease form, such as a 
“Producers 88.” However, even though the terms of the documents are seldom 
similar, the general structure of the legal relationships they create are typically 
identical. 
David E. Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445, 445–46 (1987) 
(emphasis added). The “standard relationship” consists of a grant of the right to develop the 
leased land for a specified period of time that can be extended indefinitely by production. Id. 
Failure to obtain production from the leased land causes the lease to expire. Id. In the event 
production is obtained, the lessor will be compensated by a royalty associated with the 
volume and value of production from the leased land. Id. at 446 n.3. 
 35. The current flurry of leasing for coalbed methane development in Eastern Kansas 
provides an interesting laboratory for evaluating leasing practices. One of my Contracts 
students indicated her father had been approached by a developer wanting a lease on his 
land. I suggested he might just tell them “no” to start the “negotiations.” He told them “no” 
on Friday and they came back on Sunday offering to lease for twice the previously offered 
bonus and asking what they could do to make the deal acceptable. The various developers 
seeking leases have been very willing to negotiate land use, financial, and other terms of the 
leases—but you have to ask. Like any other contracting party, they don’t negotiate against 
themselves. 
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Company (UPRC) throughout the state of Texas.36 The study was 
introduced as evidence in a class certification hearing in Union Pacific 
Resources Group, Inc. v. Neinast.37 The data consisted of a random sample 
of 980 oil and gas leases from a total of 26,000 leases encompassing 30,000 
individual royalty owners. After reading and analyzing the 980 oil and gas 
leases, I found that 
[t]here is a considerable level of contractual diversity among the 
leases sampled in my study. The vast majority of the documents 
indicate they were the product of active negotiation between the 
lessor (or the lessor’s legal counsel or other representative) and 
the lessee. This conclusion is based upon the royalty fraction 
typically being in excess of l/8th and the primary term being for 
something less than 10 years.38 For example, of the leases 
sampled, 212 provided for a l/8th royalty; the remaining 768 
provided for a royalty in excess of l/8th. My conclusion is also 
based upon frequent modifications to the lease form either by 
adding-to or striking-out language, or by the incorporation of 
special terms attached as an addendum or exhibit to the lease 
form. The frequency of individually negotiated leases in the 
sample makes it very likely additional royalty obligation 
variations would be found in leases that were not part of the 
sample.39 
Even if one accepts Professor Merrill’s premise that the oil and gas lease 
is an adhesion contract, this is simply the beginning of the analysis, not the 
end. Adhesion contracts are enforceable like any other contract. The 
“contract law” test used to identify the unenforceable adhesion contract is 
unconscionability. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 36. The study did not include leases used by UPRC in Crockett County or Sutton 
County, Texas. 
 37. 67 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. App. 2001) (reversing trial court’s certification of class and 
ordering class decertified). 
 38. Ten years was the lease primary term printed in most of the lease forms. 
 39. Report of David E. Pierce, Neinast v. Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc., No. 32,040, 
District Court of Washington County, Texas, 1–2 (2001) (Professor Pierce was called as an 
expert witness on behalf of the Union Pacific Resources Company in this action.). 
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B. The “Contract Law” Response to Professor Merrill’s Concerns 
1. Unconscionability 
The “contract law” response to unfair bargains has been the un-
conscionability analysis. However, Professor Merrill would not rely on an 
unconscionability analysis because it is not intended to cause a “disturbance 
of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.”40 In most 
cases an unconscionability analysis would not provide the court with an 
opportunity to add obligations to the oil and gas lease. The 
unconscionability analysis actually protects freedom of contract by 
imposing a principled analysis on when and how courts can go about 
modifying contracts. For example, the official comment to U.C.C. § 2-302 
provides, in part, 
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to 
police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find 
to be unconscionable. In the past such policing has been 
accomplished by adverse construction of language, by 
manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by 
determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to 
the dominant purpose of the contract. This section is intended to 
allow the court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the 
contract or particular clause therein and to make a conclusion of 
law as to its unconscionability.41 
Although the oil and gas lease is not subject to Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code,42 the parallel provision of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts43 would apply to oil and gas leases. The commentary to the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 adopts comment observations to 
U.C.C. § 2-302 and adds, “Particularly in the case of standardized 
agreements, the rule of this Section permits the court to pass directly on the 
                                                                                                                 
 40. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1977) [hereinafter U.C.C.] (citation 
omitted) (“The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of 
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. The oil and gas lease is not a “contract for sale of minerals” to be removed by the 
lessor. Id. § 2-107(1). The comment to section 2-107 would place the oil and gas lease in the 
category of “contracts affecting land” subject to the law governing land contracts. Id. § 2-
107 cmt. 1. 
 43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
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unconscionability of the contract or clause rather than to avoid 
unconscionable results by interpretation.”44 
Because the unconscionability analysis has proven to be demanding in 
practice45 there is a risk courts may revert to many of the interpretive 
devices the analysis was designed to avoid.46 It is ironic that introducing a 
principled analysis to avoid the use of less principled techniques sometimes 
causes the less principled interpretive devices to proliferate. For example, if 
a court desires an outcome that cannot be achieved by applying an 
unconscionability analysis, it may simply choose to rely upon an 
interpretive rule that will get it where it believes the equities lead. The most 
common counter-unconscionability analysis interpretive device used by 
courts is, “[I]n interpreting leases like those in this case, we are mindful of 
the generally accepted rule that oil and gas leases are strictly construed 
against the lessee in favor of the lessor.”47 Technically this is a rule of 
“construction” that should be applied only if the contract has first been 
deemed “ambiguous.”48 
However, like so many canons of construction, courts tend to use them 
when they support the desired outcome even though there may be no need 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at cmt. a. 
 45. Courts have been reluctant to use unconscionability and have generally limited it to 
the most egregious of factual situations. Professors White and Summers provide the 
following assessment of the doctrine: “As preamble let us lay out the battlefield upon which 
the 2-302 battles are fought. Most who assert 2-302 and most who have used it successfully 
in reported cases have been consumers. Most of these successful consumer litigants have 
been poor or otherwise disadvantaged.” JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 154 (5th ed. 2000). 
 46. I refer to this in another writing as a “circular unconscionability/interpretive 
analysis.” Jurisprudential Underpinnings, supra note 24, at 10-9. 
 47. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 901 (Colo. 2001). 
 48. Professor Farnsworth has commented on this rule of construction: 
An especially common example [of a rule of construction] is the rule that if 
language supplied by one party is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations, 
one of which favors each party, the one that is less favorable to the party that 
supplied the language is preferred. Such interpretation contra proferentem 
(“against the profferer”) is often rationalized on the ground that the party 
against whom it operates had the possibility of drafting the language so as to 
avoid the dispute . . . . Although the contra proferentem rule may encourage 
care in the drafting of contracts, it can scarcely be said to be designed to 
ascertain the meanings attached by the parties. It is not applicable if the 
language is unambiguous and it is often denigrated as a rule of “last resort.” 
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 473–74 (3d ed. 1999) (emphasis added). 
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to resolve an ambiguity, or even a need to interpret the express terms of the 
contract.49 
An example of this misuse of the “interpret against the lessee” canon is a 
pair of cases, Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co.50 and Schupbach v. Continental 
Oil Co.,51 where the court interpreted leases requiring a royalty based upon 
“1/8 of the proceeds of the sale thereof at the mouth of the well.”52 In each 
case the court determined the leases contained “ambiguities” and 
interpreted them “in favor of the lessor and against the lessee.”53 The end 
result of the court’s “interpretation” and “construction” was to nullify the 
“at the mouth of the well” language so the lessee could not deduct 
compression costs to transport gas from the “mouth of the well” to an 
interstate pipeline located on the leased premises. Justice Fontron revealed 
his view of the court’s strained analysis stating, 
I find it extremely difficult to accept the rationale of Gilmore v. 
Superior Oil Co. It offends my sense of logic to say that the 
market value of gas at the mouth of the well is the price for 
which the gas is ultimately sold after having been so processed 
that it has become marketable. I would consider that market 
value of gas at the well would be that amount for which it could 
be sold, after deducting such reasonable expense as was required 
to render it saleable.54 
The Kansas Supreme Court, when presented with the Gilmorel Schupbach 
ambiguity argument in Stemberger v. Marathon Oil Co.55 rejected it stating, 
The relevant portion of the lease provision governing in this 
action provides that Marathon will pay royalties of one-eighth 
(1/8) of the market price at the well for gas sold or used. The 
lease provision is silent as to deductions. Stemberger argues that 
the lease is ambiguous and therefore must be construed in her 
favor to preclude the deductions made by Marathon . . . . 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See generally Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds 
and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 103–08 
(1993). 
 50. 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964). 
 51. 394 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1964). 
 52. Schupbach, 394 P.2d at 2 (emphasis added); Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 605. 
 53. Schupbach, 394 P.2d at 4; Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 605. 
 54. Schupbach, 394 P.2d at 6 (Fontron, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 55. 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995). 
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 Stemberger correctly states that ambiguities in an oil and gas 
lease are to be construed in favor of the lessor. See Gilmore v. 
Superior Oil Co. Here, however, the lease is not ambiguous. The 
lease’s silence on the issue of post-production deductions does 
not make the lease ambiguous. The lease clearly specifies that 
royalties are to be paid based on “market price at the well.”56 
This suggests that the compression cost rulings in Gilmore and Schupbach 
should be limited to those particular cases in which the court found, and 
then resolved, ambiguities in the oil and gas leases.57 This provides an 
inherent limitation on any doctrinal damage done by courts seeking to do 
equity in a particular case; by purporting to resolve an ambiguity in a 
particular contract, the case should have little precedential effect. 
Another risk to an unconscionability analysis is that courts will 
manipulate the basic elements of unconscionability to achieve a desired 
outcome. An example of a court’s failure to apply the temporal aspect of 
the unconscionability test is Kansas Baptist Convention v. Mesa Operating 
Ltd.58 The Restatement and the Uniform Commercial Code each stress the 
term at issue must be evaluated “at the time the contract is made.”59 
Professors White and Summers note, “That it appears unconscionable at the 
time of performance is irrelevant. The test is not by hindsight.”60 
The court’s analysis and discussion in Kansas Baptist Convention is 
unique because it not only abuses basic unconscionability principles, but 
also manages to misapply “good faith” and “implied covenant” principles 
all in pursuit of an apparent “oil and gas law” solution to the Convention’s 
lack of foresight. At the heart of this case is the Convention’s 1952 decision 
to enter into a combination gas development and sales contract. The 
contract was the product of negotiation in which the Convention’s attorney 
sought and obtained concessions from Mesa’s predecessor in interest. The 
structure of the deal was designed to accommodate limitations on the 
Convention’s ability to lease the land. The hindsight problem was pretty 
simple: development and operation costs increased, but the Convention had 
agreed to a fixed-price of 10¢/Mcf for its share of the gas. At the time the 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 794 (citation omitted). 
 57. David E. Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: The Continuing 
Search for Analytical Foundations, 47 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 1-1, 1-43 (1996). 
 58. 864 P.2d 204 (Kan. 1993). 
 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 43, § 208; U.C.C., supra note 
40, § 2-302(1). 
 60. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 154. 
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Convention entered into the gas sales contract gas prices were approxi-
mately 5.5¢/Mcf. As the lawsuit unfolded in 1988 the market price for gas 
was around $1.52/Mcf.61 
When Mesa elected to drill another well under the contract in 1988, the 
practical effect would be to consume, for the indefinite future, all of the 
Convention’s gas sales revenue to pay for its share of the new well drilling 
costs. The Convention alleged Mesa acted in bad faith when it elected to 
drill the 1988 well that put the Convention in a negative income position. 
Under the contract Mesa was given the following right, 
It [Mesa] shall drill such additional well or wells on the Unitized 
Area as it should deem necessary from time to time and shall pay 
and discharge all costs and expenses incurred and shall charge 
the other parties hereto their proportionate share upon the cost 
and expense basis provided for in the schedule of 
accounting . . . . The judgment and discretion of [Mesa] 
exercised in good faith and without negligence shall be the limit 
of its liability to the other parties hereto for any act done or 
omitted to be done in good faith in the performance of any of the 
provisions of this agreement.62 
Therefore, the sole issue should have been whether Mesa acted in good 
faith when it decided to drill the 1988 well. It would appear that even if 
Mesa breached this obligation, the most it could be assessed in damages 
would be denial of the ability to recoup any of the 1988 well costs from the 
Convention.63 However, it would appear under either a subjective or 
objective good faith standard, Mesa could establish valid reasons why it 
would legitimately want to drill the 1988 well. Mesa’s conduct could have 
been evaluated by asking whether a reasonable person, without considering 
the Convention’s unique situation, would have drilled the well. There does 
not seem to be any legitimate reason to restrain the rights of Mesa and the 
other parties merely because drilling the well would have an adverse impact 
on the Convention’s revenue stream. The Convention’s problem was the 
product of entering into what turned out to be a poor contract.64 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Kan. Baptist Convention, 864 P.2d at 207–08. 
 62. Id. at 213. 
 63. This is where the court’s use of unconscionability, under any set of circumstances, 
gives the Convention a windfall by voiding the 10¢/Mcf gas contract instead of calculating 
normal breach of contract damages. See infra text accompanying notes 123–25. 
 64. Actually the Convention’s total net revenue from its interest was very close to the 
amount predicted by its attorney in 1953 when they negotiated the contract. Kan. Baptist 
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The court stated, “The present case involves an overreaching lessee.”65 
Although Mesa and the Convention were not in an oil and gas lease 
relationship, the court felt compelled to discuss implied lease covenant case 
law.66 The court, however, ultimately settled on unconscionability as the 
governing theory stating, “The parties made this contract in 1952, and we 
are only providing a remedy where subsequent changes not reasonably 
foreseeable by the parties have rendered the contract unconscionable under 
present circumstances.”67 This is not an unconscionability analysis. There is 
no procedural unconscionability; there is no substantive unconscionability. 
The “overreaching” by Mesa, according to the court, was that the 
Convention guessed wrong on the future price of gas and drilling costs. 
Since these “subsequent changes” were not “reasonably foreseeable,” 
somehow Mesa is responsible. What we have is an impracticability case 
that was not pursued as such because it was evident the Convention 
assumed the risk of just these sorts of “subsequent changes” by entering 
into an open-ended drilling cost obligation to be paid from fixed-price gas 
revenues. 
The court remanded the case to the district court to “fashion a remedy 
modifying the contract in light of the changed circumstances that have 
rendered the contract unconscionable.”68 The trial court responded by 
“reforming” the contract to relieve the Convention from the fixed-price 
provisions of the contract.69 However, the real winner in this case was not 
the Convention. The party that brought the case was Hugoton Energy 
Corporation. Hugoton Energy, relying no doubt upon the sanctity of 
contracts, purchased the Convention’s interest for $15,000, apparently 
thinking it was not worth much, other than litigation value, because of the 
10¢/Mcf gas contract. When it became apparent it would sue Mesa, 
Hugoton Energy reconveyed 10% of the interest it had purchased from the 
Convention and brought suit on its own behalf and in the name of the 
                                                                                                                 
Convention v. Mesa Operating Ltd., 898 P.2d 1131, 1138 (Kan. 1995) [hereinafter Kan. 
Baptist Convention II] (appeal following remand). 
 65. Kan. Baptist Convention, 864 P.2d at 213. The “over-reaching,” according to the 
court, occurred when “Mesa commenced to drill the third well on May 25, 1988.” Id. at 218. 
 66. The court devotes several pages to the law of implied covenants in oil and gas leases 
as background discussion; the concepts are never directly applied. Id. at 211–13. Presumably 
the court was ultimately trying to articulate a “prudent operator” standard to evaluate Mesa’s 
decision to drill the 1988 well. 
 67. Id. at 218. 
 68. Id. at 220. 
 69. Kan. Baptist Convention II, 898 P.2d at 1137. 
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Convention.70 After the litigation, Hugoton Energy’s $15,000 investment 
was worth approximately $1.9 million under the reformed terms of the 
contract.71 I wonder if Justice Allegrucci, who wrote the opinion for the 
court, would find the Convention was again the victim of “subsequent 
changes not reasonably foreseeable by the parties [the court reforming a 
fixed-price contract]” which have “rendered the contract [to sell their 
interest for $15,000] unconscionable under present circumstances [when the 
interest has a present value of $1.9 million].”72 I would submit that under 
the court’s seriously flawed unconscionability analysis the Convention’s 
agreement to sell a $1.9 million asset for $15,000 is unconscionable and 
should be “reformed” to whatever the Kansas Supreme Court thinks 
Hugoton Energy should make on its lawsuit investment. 
Kansas Baptist Convention illustrates how a doctrine designed to 
promote freedom of contract can be distorted and abused to engage in the 
same sort of judicial redrafting and reallocation of wealth the un-
conscionability doctrine was designed to avoid. Clearly, the court engaged 
in a fundamental “disturbance of allocation of risks” between the parties, 
which the unconscionability analysis was designed to avoid instead of 
promote.73 
2. The Proper Role of “Implied Covenants” 
The Kansas Supreme Court, in Smith v. Amoco Production Co.,74 
identified the two polar jurisprudential roles of “implied covenants” stating, 
A contract implied in fact is one “inferred from the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case” but which is “not formally or explicitly 
stated in words.” It is the product of agreement, although it is not 
expressed in words. A contract implied in law does not rest on 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Kan. Baptist Convention, 864 P.2d at 208. 
 71. Kan. Baptist Convention II, 898 P.2d at 1138. 
 72. Kan. Baptist Convention, 864 P.2d at 218. Counsel for Mesa noted that Hugoton En-
ergy would receive a 12,000% return on its investment. Kan. Baptist Convention II, 898 P.2d 
at 1141. 
 73. This case also illustrates that often the problem is not manipulating the law of oil 
and gas to achieve a desired outcome. Any body of law, including contract law, can be 
manipulated. However, it is often easier to detect departures from the law of contract, 
particularly when many of the oil and gas law concepts have been specifically developed to 
accommodate judicial manipulation. 
 74. 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001). 
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actual agreement. It is a legal fiction created by courts to ensure 
justice or to prevent unjust enrichment.75 
After evaluating case law and Professor Merrill’s implied-in-law approach 
to implied covenants, the court concluded, “We choose to join Oklahoma, 
Texas, and Montana in holding that the covenants [implied in oil and gas 
leases] are implied in fact.”76 This means that before a covenant can be 
implied, the court must determine, from the express terms of the oil and gas 
lease, whether it is “necessary.” 
Under a contract law analysis a covenant will be implied only when it is 
necessary to give full effect to the parties’ express agreement in which a 
term has been omitted. Therefore, the express terms of the agreement 
determine whether an additional term is necessary to make the contract 
complete. To determine if the agreement is incomplete, it must first be 
interpreted. Only after meaning has been ascribed to the express terms can 
it be determined whether an omission exists. Upon interpretation, the 
express terms may resolve the issue and eliminate the need for an implied 
term. For example, in Kansas, courts have defined the term “market value” 
in the oil and gas lease as requiring a royalty reflecting: (1) “value or price 
at the current rate prevailing when the gas is delivered”77 and (2) the value 
or price being a “price which would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing 
seller in a free market.”78 Therefore, the obligation to pay a royalty of one-
eighth of the “market value” needs no interpretation. There is nothing 
missing;79 there is no omitted term to be supplied by implication. 
The Texas Supreme Court,80 in Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc.,81 
refused to consider any sort of implied covenant “[b]ecause the lease 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. at 265 (citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 268. 
 77. Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 664 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Kan. 1983). 
 78. Id. at 1341 (quoting Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 P.2d 1, Syl. 4 (Kan. 1977)). 
 79. However, the inquiry will also require that we ascertain “where” the market value of 
the production will be determined. This is typically addressed by other express terms of the 
lease that specify a valuation location, such as: at the well, at the mouth of the well, at the 
tailgate of a processing plant, at the outlet of the separator, at the connection of the flow line 
to the gathering system, at the gathering system connection to an intrastate or interstate 
pipeline. 
 80. Texas defines “market value” in a manner similar to Kansas. Exxon Corp. v. 
Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 
(Tex. 1968). See generally David E. Pierce, Royalty Calculation in a Restructured Gas 
Market, 13 E. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, 18-15 to 18-19 (1992) [hereinafter Royalty Calculation]. 
 81. 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001). 
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provides an objective basis for calculating royalties.”82 The analysis that has 
developed in Texas to evaluate the “need” for resorting to implied 
covenants was summarized by the court in HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel83 
to include the following, 
A covenant will not be implied unless it appears from the 
express terms of the contract that “it was so clearly within the 
contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to 
express it,” and therefore they omitted to do so, or “it must 
appear that it is necessary to infer such a covenant in order to 
effectuate the full purpose of the contract as a whole as gathered 
from the written instrument.” A court cannot imply a covenant to 
achieve what it believes to be a fair contract or to remedy an 
unwise or improvident contract . . . .84 
This is a classic statement of the “implied-in-fact” covenant analysis. 
If, after applying the analysis, the court finds something is missing, it 
will proceed to the second step of the implied-in-fact analysis and fashion 
an implied covenant that is fully consistent with the express terms of the 
contract. For example, the Eighth Circuit in Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co. 
illustrates this step of the analysis stating, 
It is conceded, as indeed it must be, that the lease contains no ex-
press stipulation as to what, if anything, should be done in the 
way of searching for and producing oil or gas after the first five 
years; but it does not follow from this that it is silent on the 
subject, or that the matter is left absolutely to the will of the 
lessee. Whatever is implied in a contract is as effectual as what is 
expressed. Implication is but another name for intention, and if it 
arises from the language of the contract when considered in its 
entirety, and is not gathered from the mere expectations of one 
or both of the parties, it is controlling.85 
The court proceeded to fashion an implied obligation to further develop the 
leased lands in a manner complimenting, instead of negating or altering, the 
express terms of the oil and gas lease. 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. at 374. 
 83. 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998). 
 84. Id. at 888–89 (quoting Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635 
(Tex. 1941)) (citation omitted). 
 85. 140 F. 801, 809 (8th Cir. 1905). 
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3. The Proper Role of “Good Faith” 
Good faith is an interpretive device that can impose limitations on a 
party’s discretion when, in the context of the express contract terms, 
limitations are appropriate. However, the express terms of the contract 
define the nature and scope of the obligation to perform and enforce the 
contract in good faith. For example, termination of a contract, without 
cause, may be acceptable if the express terms of the contract are followed, 
regardless of the hardship it may impose on the other party. This was the 
situation in St. Catherine Hospital of Garden City v. Rodriguez86 where the 
contract between the hospital and its radiology services provider stated, 
“‘[T]his contract may be terminated by [appellee or appellant] at any time, 
without cause, by giving written notice of such termination to the other 
party not less than ninety (90) days prior to the selected termination 
date.’”87 When the Hospital followed the terms of the contract and 
terminated following the notice period, Rodriguez sued asserting the 
termination had been a breach of the hospital’s duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. Rejecting Rodriguez’s argument, the court noted, 
The problem with Dr. Rodriguez’ breach of contract cause of 
action is that the Hospital terminated the agreement precisely 
within the terms of the parties’ agreement . . . . 
 There are explicit clauses in some agreements that, in effect, 
eliminate any implication of good faith and fair dealing. For in-
stance, when an agreement permits a termination, without cause, 
by the giving of 90 days’ notice, the parties ought to be bound by 
this agreement. From the date the agreement was signed to the 
date termination was given, Dr. Rodriguez was well aware that 
the Hospital could terminate his agreement at any time without 
cause by giving him 90 days’ notice. If no cause was necessary, 
then it is largely irrelevant whether the Hospital acted in good 
faith or bad faith. It was not required to have a valid or fair 
reason to terminate. The only requirement was the giving of 90 
days’ written notice. To hold that the right to terminate without 
cause can only be exercised in good faith simply rewrites the 
agreement of the parties.88 
                                                                                                                 
 86. 971 P.2d 754 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998). 
 87. Id. at 756. 
 88. Id. 
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St. Catherine merely illustrates the basic rule that the express terms of the 
contract can be sufficiently clear so that interpretation is unnecessary. Of 
course, if the clear, express terms create a fundamentally unfair situation, or 
otherwise violate public policy, unconscionability and other policing 
devices are available to protect the contracting party. But these are not 
interpretive issues. 
The “duty of good faith and fair dealing” is defined by the express terms 
of the contract. For example, the Restatement provides, “Every contract 
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement.”89 The Uniform Commercial Code uses 
similar language.90 As the UCC comment indicates, 
This section does not support an independent cause of action for 
failure to perform or enforce in good faith. Rather, this section 
means that a failure to perform or enforce, in good faith, a 
specific duty or obligation under the contract, constitutes a 
breach of that contract or makes unavailable, under the particular 
circumstances, a remedial right or power. This distinction makes 
it clear that the doctrine of good faith merely directs a court 
towards interpreting contracts within the commercial context in 
which they are created, performed, and enforced, and does not 
create a separate duty of fairness and reasonableness which can 
be independently breached.91 
To the extent the term at issue is self-defining on the range of acceptable 
conduct, a good faith analysis is not required. For example, the obligation 
to pay a market value royalty is self-defining. 
IV. Interpreting the Oil and Gas Lease “Contract” 
Oil and gas disputes can often be effectively resolved by first defining 
the true nature of the interpretive problem. Does the problem relate to an 
omitted term or the meaning of a term or terms present in the contract? 
Implied covenant analysis is typically associated with the omitted term 
problem while a good faith analysis can be triggered by a meaning problem. 
However, courts have, under the rubric of “oil and gas law,” tried to apply 
an omitted term/implied covenant analysis to situations that may require a 
simple meaning analysis or a good faith analysis. Therefore, the first task is 
                                                                                                                 
 89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 43, § 205 (emphasis added). 
 90. U.C.C., supra note 40, § 1-203 (1977). 
 91. Id. § 1-203 cmt. (emphasis added). 
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to define the nature of the problem: is there really a missing term, or are we 
merely trying to define the meaning of a term? 
A. Is Something Really Missing? 
If implied covenants are viewed as being implied-in-law, something will 
be missing in the oil and gas lease whenever judicial intervention is desired 
to adjust the equities of the situation.92 If implied covenants are implied-in-
fact, then often they will not be needed because the express terms of the 
contract adequately define the rights and obligations of the parties. Also, if 
the rights and obligations of the parties are not fully defined, but the 
problem is not an absence of terms but the meaning of a term, then an 
additional covenant, under an implied-in-fact analysis, would be 
unnecessary. However, to understand why arguments over terms and 
meaning will continue, at least with regard to the calculation of royalty, one 
must understand the royalty value theorem. 
1. The Royalty Value Theorem 
The royalty value theorem recognizes the inherent conflict between 
lessor and lessee when the lessor is compensated through a fixed fraction of 
the value of oil and gas. The theorem provides, “When compensation under 
a contract is based upon a set percentage of the value of something, there 
will be a tendency by each party to either minimize or maximize the 
value.”93 To understand how the theorem works in practice, the physical 
and economic facts regarding the production and marketing of oil and gas 
must be recognized. First, oil and gas tend to increase in value as they move 
downstream from the point of production. Second, much of the increase in 
value can be attributed to costs associated with transporting, treating, aggre-
gating, packaging, and marketing the production. The resulting downstream 
value of the production consists of two components: (1) the enhanced value 
associated with the actual investments in the production; and (2) the 
enhanced value of the production in its current form and location. 
The theorem recognizes that lessors will seek to maximize the value of 
their fraction of royalty by arguing for a valuation point as far removed 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See generally Jurisprudential Underpinnings, supra note 24. 
 93. David E. Pierce, What’s Behind the Valuation Controversy Anyway?, in FEDERAL & 
INDIAN OIL & GAS ROYALTY VALUATION & MANAGEMENT III, 1-1 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. 
Found. 2000) (original statement of the theorem); David E. Pierce, The Royalty Value 
Theorem and the Legal Calculus of Post-Extraction Costs, 23 ENERGY MIN. L. INST. ch. 6 
(2003) (expanded discussion of the royalty value theorem). 
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from the point of production as possible.94 Lessees, in turn, will argue for a 
valuation point at the moment the oil and gas is extracted from the ground. 
The lessee is often aided by express contract language specifying a royalty 
equal to either a share of the “oil” when produced or a share of the value of 
“gas” calculated “at the well” or “at the mouth of the well.”95 This language 
suggests, in seemingly clear terms, that the valuation for royalty purposes 
should take place at or near the point of extraction. The lessor’s task will be 
to argue for additional implied terms regarding where the calculation should 
be made because the express terms thwart their desire for a fraction of the 
greater downstream value. 
An excellent example of the confusion caused by the “oil and gas law” 
approach to interpreting the lease contract is Stemberger v. Marathon Oil 
Co.,96 where the court acknowledged the express terms of the contract 
resolved the issue, but felt compelled to pay homage to the presumed 
existence of an implied covenant to market. The royalty value theorem was 
in full force in Stemberger: the express terms of the lease required a 
fractional royalty on “the market price at the well.”97 The lessee transported 
                                                                                                                 
 94. As I have noted previously, 
In most cases, if production is obtained from the leased land, the royalty will 
become the primary source of landowner compensation under the leasing 
transaction. Once the oil and gas lease is entered into, and production has been 
obtained, there are only two ways a lessor can maximize his royalty income: (1) 
increase the volume of production; (2) increase the value of production. The 
situs of the lessor’s volume- and value-enhancing efforts is often a courthouse. 
David E. Pierce, The Missing Link in Royalty Analysis: An Essay on Resolving Value-Based 
Royalty Disputes, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 185, 185 (1999) [hereinafter Missing Link] 
(emphasis added). 
 95. For example, the AAPL Form 675 Oil and Gas Lease provides the following, 
3. The royalties to be paid by Lessee are as follows: On oil, one-eighth of that 
produced and saved from said land, the same to be delivered at the wells or to 
the credit of Lessor into the pipe line to which the wells may be connected. 
Lessee shall have the option to purchase any royalty oil in its possession, 
paying the market price therefor prevailing for the field where produced on the 
date of purchase. On gas, including casinghead gas, condensate or other 
gaseous substances, produced from said land and sold or used off the premises 
or for the extraction of gasoline or other products therefrom, the market value 
at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at 
the wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale. 
EUGENE O. KUNTZ, ET AL., FORMS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL 
AND GAS LAW 12 (3d ed. 1998) (emphasis added). 
 96. 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995). 
 97. Id. at 792. This was a class action that included overriding royalty interests and 
lessors in several states. In an apparent attempt to keep a class together at all costs, the 
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the gas downstream from the well where it was sold. The lessee sought to 
pay royalty based upon the downstream price minus the cost of moving the 
gas from the well to the downstream sales point. The lessor argued royalty 
was due on the downstream price, without any deduction for costs to move 
the gas to the sales point. In the first twelve pages of the court’s opinion, 
under the heading “PIPELINE FROM WELL,” the court applies a basic 
contract analysis and arrives at an accurate conclusion. However, in order 
to justify applying Kansas law to resolve the rights of all members in the 
class, the court’s opinion, under the heading “CONFLICT OF LAWS,” in 
the next five pages, applies an “oil and gas law” analysis that introduces the 
implied covenant to interpret what the court has already concluded was 
clear, express contract language. 
In its “first” opinion98 the court in Stemberger held that 
Scott, Voshell, and Molter are dispositive of the issue in this 
case. These cases clearly show that where royalties are based on 
market price “at the well,” or where the lessee receives his or her 
share of the oil or gas “at the well,” the lessee must bear a 
proportionate share of the expenses in transporting the gas or oil 
to a distant market.99 
                                                                                                                 
plaintiffs stipulated with the defendant that “the rights of all parties should be construed 
according to the language of the gas royalty clause in Stemberger’s lease.” Id. Unfortunately 
for members of the class, the class representative, Stemberger, had a royalty clause that was 
among the least favorable for making its case. Id. With this stipulation the express terms of 
the other class members were swept away and replaced with the following: “one-eighth 
(1/8), at the market price at the well, (but, as to gas sold by lessee, in no event more than 
one-eighth (1/8) of the proceeds received by lessee from such sales) . . . .” Id. 
 98. Id. at 794 (the portion of the opinion entitled “PIPELINE FROM WELL”). 
 99. Id. at 796. See also Scott v. Steinberger, 213 P. 646 (Kan. 1923). The Scott case 
concerned a downstream sale of gas for 15¢ per thousand cubic feet (“Mcf”) from which the 
lessee deducted 7¢/Mcf to account for the cost of moving the gas from the wellhead to the 
point of sale. Id. at 647. The lessee paid the lessor its one-eighth royalty using the resulting 
8¢/Mcf figure. Id. The lessor argued they were entitled to one-eighth of 15¢/Mcf instead of 
the one-eighth of 8¢ they received. Id. In Stemberger the court described the holding in 
Scott, 
This court determined the parties contemplated that the market price of the gas 
should be determined at the place where the wells were connected with the 
pipeline and not at some distant market where the gas might be sold. Thus, 
where the price of the gas was to be determined at the well, royalties were to be 
paid at a rate of 8 cents per MCF, the reasonable value of the gas at the field. 
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The court held that the lease was clear regarding the location at which 
royalty must be calculated: “at the well” as opposed to a location that is not 
“at the well.” This simply gave effect to the express terms of the contract. 
As an introduction to its “second” opinion,100 the court observed, “The 
lessee has the duty to produce a marketable product, and the lessee alone 
bears the expense in making the product marketable.”101 If the court was 
able to resolve the interpretive problem using the express covenant to value 
royalty “at the well,” there would be no need to resort to implied covenants. 
This is where “oil and gas law” begins to negate sound “contract law” 
analysis. This is also where the court starts to flounder as it seeks to 
harmonize the “oil and gas” law of Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas to justify 
its choice of law conclusions. However, the court returned to the express 
terms of the lease under the heading “REASONABLENESS OF 
DEDUCTIONS,”102 noting that 
[t]his case turns on the fact that the royalty was to be paid based 
on “market price at the well” and the gas was marketable at the 
well, but there was no market at the well. The parties in this case 
dispute Marathon’s deduction of transportation expenses, but 
there has been no evidence or finding as to what the market price 
at the well was. Because sale occurred away from the well or the 
lease premises, we assume that royalties were paid based on the 
market price at a distant market rather than market price at the 
well. Amicus API seems to recognize this. API suggests that this 
court should remand the case to the district court “to determine 
the ‘market price at the well’ by determining the reasonable cost 
to transport the gas from the wellhead to the point where it could 
be sold off the lease under circumstances where no market 
existed at the well and the lessee had to build its own connecting 
pipeline.” Marathon disagrees with API and argues that remand 
is not appropriate because the parties have not requested it and 
                                                                                                                 
Stemberger, 894 P.2d at 795. The Voshell and Molter cases addressed similar issues 
concerning the downstream marketing of oil. Molter v. Lewis, 134 P.2d 404 (Kan. 1943); 
Voshell v. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., 19 P.2d 456 (Kan. 1933). 
 100. Stemberger, 894 P.2d at 800 (the portion of the opinion titled “CONFLICT OF 
LAWS”). 
 101. Id. at 799. 
 102. Id. at 805. 
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because the only evidence presented was that the amount 
deducted was reasonable.103 
Although the lessee was successful at focusing the court on the express 
terms of the lease, the lessors were also successful at getting the court to 
assume an implied covenant analysis was required, even though the 
question could be fully answered by interpreting the express “at the well” 
language. The problem here concerned the meaning of the express terms “at 
the well”; it had nothing to do with a missing term. The terms were there, 
the court just had to apply them—as it clearly did in its “first” Stemberger 
opinion. 
2. The Scope of the Contractual Relationship 
To maximize royalty under the royalty value theorem, lessors will seek 
to expand the scope of the oil and gas lease relationship to include 
enterprises the lessee may engage in downstream of the leased premises. 
This is often attempted by characterizing the oil and gas lease as some sort 
of “cooperative venture” or “joint enterprise.”104 The lessor seeks to have its 
royalty rights follow the production as it moves downstream from the 
leased premises because it will generally increase in value as it moves 
further away from where it was extracted. The most common problem the 
lessor encounters in its quest for downstream value is the express language 
of the lease indicating royalty is to be determined at or near the point where 
the oil or gas is extracted. 
Even absent the commonly encountered “at the well” language, the entire 
oil and gas lease is structured around a relationship that begins, and ends, at 
the leased land.105 For example, the granting clause grants the lessee rights 
to explore, develop, and produce from, the leased land. The duration of the 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. at 806. The author was one of the attorneys representing the American Petroleum 
Institute that participated in Stemberger by filing an amicus brief on appeal. Id. at 788. My 
main contribution to the analysis was that nobody, on either side of the case, had addressed 
the real issue: since the lease requires a royalty based upon “market price at the well,” the 
focus of the trial should be on answering the single question: what is the market price of gas 
at the well? If the amount paid as royalty was less than that number, the lessee breached its 
contract; if the amount paid was equal to or greater than that number, the contract was not 
breached. This is simply an application of the express terms of the contract, which is all that 
should have been required under the facts of this case. 
 104. See generally McArthur, supra note 20, at 834–37. 
 105. See generally Missing Link, supra note 94; David E. Pierce, Incorporating a 
Century of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence into the “Modern” Oil and Gas Lease, 33 
WASHBURN L.J. 786, 819–28 (1994). 
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lease will continue only so long as there is production from the leased land. 
Activities to extend the lease beyond the stated term must take place on the 
leased land. Royalty is generated only from production that is obtained 
from the leased land. The lessee will argue that the scope of the relationship 
is defined by the leased land so that whatever business activities the lessee 
engages in away from the leased land are independent from its lease 
obligations. 
The basic issue is when, during the life of the lease, does the lease cease 
to govern a barrel of extracted oil or a thousand cubic feet of extracted gas? 
The lessee would argue, under a lease providing for a royalty on gas, that 
the lease relationship, as to any extracted gas, ends when the gas is 
extracted. At this point the surrounding facts will determine the parties’ 
rights in the extracted gas. For example, if it is used to support lease 
operations, there may be no royalty due on the extracted gas.106 If it is “sold 
at the wells,” a royalty equal to one-eighth of the sales proceeds may be 
due.107 If it is not sold at the well, and not used to support lease operations, 
a royalty equal to one-eighth of the market value of the gas may be due.108 
In each situation, nothing remains to be done by the lessee but apply the 
terms of the lease contract to identify the royalty that is due. The lessee’s 
obligation is complete at the time the gas is extracted. As to the extracted 
gas, the lessee should be able to take it and do what they please without 
concern for its prior association with an oil and gas lease. 
This is another area where the express covenants of the lease limit the 
scope of the parties’ relationship and implied covenants are being used by 
the lessor to try and expand the limits. The lessor response has been to 
argue the lessee, in addition to its express obligations, has an implied 
obligation to “market.” “Market,” being a rather imprecise term, introduces 
an opportunity for “interpretation.” However, note that in this case the 
implied covenant is being used to obscure what is otherwise pretty clear 
express language. What necessitates implying the marketing obligation 
                                                                                                                 
 106. For example, the lease might provide, “Lessee shall have free use of oil, gas and 
water from said land . . . for all operations hereunder, and the royalty on oil and gas shall be 
computed after deducting any so used.” AAPL Form 675 Oil and Gas Lease 1 3, reproduced 
in KUNTZ, supra note 95, at 12. 
 107. For example, the AAPL Form 675 Oil and Gas Lease states, “provided that on gas 
sold at the wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 108. For example, the AAPL Form 675 Oil and Gas Lease states, “On gas . . . produced 
from said land and sold or used off the premises or for the extraction of gasoline or other 
products therefrom, the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or 
used . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
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when the rights of the parties can be ascertained using the express terms of 
the lease? Where is the omitted term in this situation? The completeness of 
the royalty obligation may depend upon whether the implied covenant is 
characterized as implied-in-law as opposed to implied-in-fact. If the cove-
nant is implied-in-law, the agreement is presumably not complete until it 
meets the court’s view of what is “fair.” Under a properly applied implied-
in-fact analysis an additional covenant in many cases will be unnecessary. 
Most situations are merely an issue of the “meaning” of the term. 
B. Is it a “Meaning” Problem? 
The law of oil and gas has frequently caused courts to evaluate situations 
applying the wrong analysis. This is where a “contract law” approach can 
be particularly revealing and useful in identifying the true nature of the task 
before the court: is it an omitted term problem or a meaning problem? If it 
is an omitted term problem, the court will often need to apply an implied 
covenant analysis. However, if the problem is determining the “meaning” 
or operation of an “open” term, a good faith analysis will often be required. 
The influence of “oil and gas law,” and the “law of” implied covenants, has 
caused courts to apply an implied covenant analysis to all problems—even 
“meaning” problems where a good faith analysis is the appropriate 
response. For example, one of the leading Texas “implied marketing 
covenant” cases is really a “good faith” case. 
In Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote,109 the royalty 
clause provided that Amoco would pay its lessor a share of “the amount 
realized from such sale” of the gas production.110 Amoco entered into a gas 
contract to sell gas from the leased land at a price approximately one-half 
the price others were selling their gas for at the time.111 This seemingly odd 
behavior by Amoco was understandable because it had several other leases 
in the field, where the gas had been dedicated to the same purchaser under 
prior contracts at 17¢/Mcf, and the purchaser agreed to increase the contract 
price for this dedicated gas from 17¢ to 70¢.112 The trade-off, however, was 
that Amoco would dedicate additional acreage, including plaintiff’s leased 
land, to the gas purchaser at a price of 70¢/Mcf when the going price was in 
the range of $1.40/Mcf. The lessor sued Amoco and the court began its 
opinion stating, “This case involves the issue of an implied covenant to 
                                                                                                                 
 109. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. App. 1979). 
 110. Id. at 288. 
 111. It appears Amoco agreed to sell gas from the leased land for about 70¢/Mcf when 
others were able to obtain contracts to sell at approximately $1.40/Mcf. Id. at 282–83. 
 112. Id. 
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market natural gas at fair market value under a lease which provides for a 
royalty based upon the amount realized from the sale of such gas.”113 
What is the “omitted term” that necessitates implying a term? The 
problem appears to be interpreting the lessee’s obligations when it has 
agreed to pay its lessor a fraction of “the amount realized” under the lease. 
This is a “meaning” problem, not an omitted term problem. The real issue 
is, because the lessee has the ability to unilaterally impact “the amount 
realized,” what sort of restraints, if any, should be placed on the lessee to 
ensure the intent of the parties is fulfilled? Although the court purported to 
apply an implied covenant analysis, it stated, “We conclude there is an 
implied covenant to exercise good faith in the marketing of gas, and 
particularly so where the interests of the lessor and lessee are not 
identical.”114 This appears to be more of a “good faith” analysis instead of 
an “implied covenant” analysis.115 The Supreme Court, in refusing the 
application for writ of error, commented on the Court of Appeals’ good 
faith analysis stating, 
It is implicit in the court’s reasoning that there was evidence of a 
breach of the covenant to market in good faith in Amoco’s 
marketing of the lessors’ gas at a rate substantially lower than 
market value, where by doing so Amoco was able to obtain for 
itself the collateral benefit of increasing the price for gas from its 
other previously dedicated leases from third parties.116 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. at 282. 
 114. Id. at 285. 
 115. Dissenting Justice Preslar picked up on the good faith analysis stating, 
We do not need to discuss or determine whether the failure “to act in good 
faith” is sufficient legal excuse to overcome the express contractual terms 
because it is evident from the record that there is no proof of any such failure to 
act in good faith. As is seen, the only “proof” is that Appellant sold its gas for 
less than others sold theirs. Obviously, this is not enough to sustain the 
judgment. Otherwise, all who have contracted for less than the top price paid 
by others are in default under their oil and gas lease regardless of reasons for 
entering such contract other than price. 
Id. at 290 (Preslar, C.J., dissenting). 
 116. Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote, 611 S.W.2d 610, 610 (Tex. 
1980). The court cautioned, 
However, this holding should not be interpreted as implying an absolute duty to 
sell gas at a market value under a “proceeds” royalty clause. The parties can 
draft either a “market value” or a “proceeds” royalty provision, and their intent 
will be followed by the courts. Although, in a proper factual setting, failure to 
sell at market value may be relevant evidence of a breach of the covenant to 
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In many instances, determining the meaning of a term will not require a 
good faith analysis. For example, when the lease requires payment of a 
fraction of “market value” as a royalty, the lessee has no discretion or any 
ability to manipulate the situation.117 This raises an issue under many leases 
that contain optional royalty provisions allowing the lessee to pay the lessor 
based on “proceeds” or “amount realized” if the gas is “sold at the well,” or 
the “market value” if the gas is “used” or otherwise not “sold at the 
well.”118 The court in Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc. alluded to the issue, 
but was not required to address it, suggesting in any event there was a good 
faith basis for KCS’ off-lease marketing.119 This presents an interesting 
question regarding the express terms of the lease: (1) was the option 
designed to provide the lessee a “right” to market the extracted gas in any 
manner it desires120—so long as the lessor receives royalty based upon 
either what the lessee gets for the gas when sold at the well or the market 
value, at the well, of gas used or marketed off the lease? or (2) was the 
option designed to impose an “obligation” on the lessee to dispose of gas so 
as to maximize the net return to the lessor—depending upon the unique 
analysis a particular jurisdiction uses to define market value?121 Without 
                                                                                                                 
market in good faith, it is merely probative and not conclusive. 
Id. 
 117. E.g., Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001). 
 118. For example, the AAPL Form 675 Oil and Gas Lease provides, 
3. The royalties to be paid by Lessee are as follows: . . . . On gas, including 
casinghead gas, condensate or other gaseous substances, produced from said 
land and sold or used off the premises or for the extraction of gasoline or other 
products therefrom, the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so 
sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall be one-
eighth of the amount realized from such sale. 
KUNTZ, supra note 95, at 12 (emphasis added). 
 119. Yzaguirre, 53 S.W.3d at 374 n.3. The court identified the issue stating, 
The Royalty Owners do not argue that KCS breached the covenant to market 
reasonably by selling the gas away from the leased property in order to reduce 
the royalties it owed to the Royalty Owners. Although the leases’ bifurcated 
royalty clause would have based royalties on actual proceeds if the sales had 
occurred at the well, KCS agreed to off-premises sales in the 1979 GPA [gas 
purchase agreement], long before it could have known the GPA price would 
exceed the market price of gas. 
Id. 
 120. This argument would seem to be particularly strong where the lessee has the option 
to “use” the gas and not market it at all. 
 121. For example, does the court calculate “market value” at the time the gas is extracted 
or at the time the gas sales contract was entered into by the lessee? Royalty Calculation, 
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addressing the issue directly, the Kansas Supreme Court and others have 
assumed the option is a “right” the lessee can exercise without regard for its 
impact on the royalty calculation.122 
Lessees will seek to address this issue as one of interpreting the 
“meaning” of the royalty clause. Lessors will argue for an implied covenant 
analysis that requires the lessee to take whatever action is required to get 
the lessor the best deal. However, the problem will probably be resolved by 
applying the express terms of the lease supplemented by a good faith 
analysis for cases like Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of 
Pyote.123 
C. “Contract” Damages or “Punishment” Damages? 
We have already seen, in the Kansas Baptist Convention case,124 an 
example where the court granted a party “punishment” damages instead of 
“contract” damages. Although the court was responding to what it thought 
was Mesa’s bad faith in imposing the costs of a third well against the 
Convention’s revenue stream, instead of merely eliminating the offending 
costs,125 the court modified the underlying contract and took away $1.9 
million in value from Mesa and gave it to the Convention and Hugoton 
Energy Corporation.126 As in the Kansas Baptist Convention case, a sure 
sign a court has departed from contract principles into the unprincipled 
realm of “equity” is when the damages sought have no relationship to a 
                                                                                                                 
supra note 80, at 18-22 to 18-34 (discussing the various approaches to defining “market 
value”). 
 122. The courts have generally sought to ascertain, as a matter of fact, how the gas is 
being marketed and then merely applied the appropriate portion of the royalty clause to 
compensate the lessor. E.g., Waechter v. Amoco Prod. Co., 537 P.2d 228, 247–48 (Kan. 
1975) (giving effect to Amoco’s sale of gathering system that changed point of sale from an 
off-lease “market value” to an on-lease “proceeds” transaction under the oil and gas lease). 
 123. See Unfinished Business, supra note 23, at 3-8 to 3-10. 
 124. Kan. Baptist Convention v. Mesa Operating Ltd., 864 P.2d 204 (Kan. 1993). 
 125. The costs would have amounted to $54,375 (5/16 x $174,100). Id. at 207. 
 126. The injustice in this after-the-fact modification of the contract is that Mesa, when it 
acquired its contract rights in 1969, most likely valued its predecessor’s contract rights as 
though it would have the opportunity to purchase 5/16ths of the gas for 10¢/Mcf. Id. at 206–
07. The facts are clear that this was the basis on which Hugoton Energy and the Convention 
entered into their contract that valued the same rights in 1988 at $15,000. Id. at 208. The 
market had already valued the contract, as written, at $15,000. Id. As re-written by the court, 
its value increased to $1.9 million—all based upon Mesa’s attempt to recoup $54,375. Of 
course, this also means Mesa’s value in the contract decreased by $1.9 million because of its 
breach. These “equitable” punitive damages for breach of contract are thirty-one times the 
actual damages allegedly suffered by the Convention and Hugoton Energy. 
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breach of the underlying contract. One of the first principles we discuss in 
my Contracts course is that “the law is concerned mainly with relief of 
promisees to redress breach and not with punishment of promisors to 
compel performance.”127 This principle should be used to evaluate whether 
the plaintiff’s damage theory is contract-based or the product of an attempt 
to confuse the issue in hopes of finding a sympathetic judge, juror, or 
justice. 
In the royalty arena, the best examples of plaintiffs seeking “pun-
ishment” damages for a breach of contract are in the “affiliate transaction” 
cases. The real contractual goal of the lessor in these cases is to obtain a 
royalty on values downstream from the well—even though their lease 
provides for an “at the well” royalty value. The lessor faces an immediate 
interpretive problem because in many jurisdictions, like Kansas and Texas, 
the courts will give effect to the express “at the well” language in the lease 
contract.128 Today it is common practice for a producing company to sell its 
production to an affiliated marketing company which aggregates, packages, 
and markets the gas downstream from the well.129 The producing company 
will pay royalty based upon what it receives from the marketing 
company.130 The lessor will attack this transaction, asserting the affiliate 
transaction has cut the lessor out of value it was entitled to. This value was 
instead transferred to the producing company’s affiliated marketing 
company. The key issue is determining what the lessor “was entitled to.” 
If the lease provides for a gas royalty based upon “market value at the 
well,” the issue will be what was the market value of the gas, at the well. 
Assume the lessee pays the lessor based upon a $1.00/Mcf value. If lessor 
contests this payment, and it is ultimately held the “market value at the 
well” was $1.05/Mcf instead of $1.00, the lessor’s contract damages will be 
$0.05/Mcf. This is a classic contract damages model: contract price – price 
paid = damages. However, the lessor will be entitled to damages only if the 
amount paid is less than the market value at the well. Recognizing this 
dilemma, counsel for lessors have started to argue that since the lessee has 
sold the gas to their affiliate, the court should disregard the corporate 
separateness of the producing and marketing companies and look only to 
                                                                                                                 
 127. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (6th ed. 2001). 
 128. E.g., Stemberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788, 794 (Kan. 1995); Judice v. 
Mewboume Oil Co., 939 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex. 1996). 
 129. See generally Judith M. Matlock, Payment of Gas Royalties in Affiliate 
Transactions, 48 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 9-1 (1997). 
 130. This amount will typically be based upon a recognized area index price which 
generally equates to the current market value of the gas as produced. 
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the value obtained from the sale by the marketing company to an 
unaffiliated third party. By modifying their damages request, they are able 
to obtain the downstream value they would otherwise be denied under their 
contract. The fact they seek to obscure is that the basis for their complaint is 
still breach of contract: did they receive market value at the well for their 
gas? To the extent a court uses the sale by the affiliated marketing company 
to define the “contract price,” it is disregarding the “market value at the 
well” contractual limitation on the lessor’s royalty. 
An artful statement of the lessor’s damage theory is provided by an 
attorney that has made the argument on several occasions: 
 Although couched under the duty to market or something 
based on lease terms, the true issue is again the narrower mutual 
benefit issue.131 These cases rarely claim that a higher price was 
available than the price the lessee actually received when it or its 
affiliate resold the gas.132 Nor do they seek a full review of 
market values.133 The royalty owners are not contesting the 
operator’s marketing diligence. They just want equal treatment 
by sharing the price received, directly or indirectly.134 
 Nor should these royalty owners need to prove that the price 
the lessee ultimately did receive in third-party sales was the 
comparable market value in the field.135 What they are saying is 
that diligence in getting the best price requires at least the efforts 
that their own lessee thought best for its own production;136 
presumably it did act prudently in getting the price it did;137 but 
                                                                                                                 
 131. This means do not look at the express lease terms, or the implied covenant to 
market, because there will often be something there that causes a problem, such as “at the 
well” or “market value” language. 
 132. This is because the price already represents a downstream value that is obtained by 
the marketing affiliate, which often includes aggregating, packaging, and marketing 
expenses, including expenses associated with moving the gas from the wellhead to the point 
of sale by the marketing affiliate to an unaffiliated third party. 
 133. The reason they do not is that “a full review of market values” would consider the 
appropriate location for determining the value, which will often be “at the well.” 
 134. They just want royalty based upon a value “not at the well” instead of “at the well.” 
 135. Because if you did, you would realize the third-party sale included downstream 
values, which should not be included to determine “at the well” values. 
 136. But the lessee is not limited in any way to an “at the well” value. 
 137. Often the “lessee selection” argument will be made by lessor’s counsel. For 
example, 
Yet part of the lessee’s promise is that it will make its expertise available to the 
royalty owners. The obligation to share fully should not be lessened if the 
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it has to share that price.138 The lessee got a separate benefit139 
and should have to disgorge the portion attributable to its royalty 
owners’ share.140 
Note that in this situation lessor’s counsel is arguing his permutation of “oil 
and gas law” in hopes a court will explore the current fairness of the 
proposed new agreement instead of evaluating the conscionability of the 
contract.141 Applying “contract law” to the situation will often cause the 
case to fold when the express lease terms require a wellhead valuation for 
royalty. 
V. Conclusions 
The dynamics of the oil and gas lease, and the evolution of the law of oil 
and gas, provide a jurisprudential laboratory to evaluate why and how 
courts react to situations they believe require their equitable intervention. 
After a century of oil and gas litigation, we can see courts vacillating 
between “contract law” and “oil and gas law,” depending upon their 
willingness to give effect to the express terms of the oil and gas lease 
contract. Courts faithful to contract law enforce the lease contract as 
                                                                                                                 
lessee’s efforts can produce a better than average return. If the lessee is a large, 
experienced marketer, its expertise will be precisely why landowners want to 
sign up with it. It cannot avoid this obligation just by donning a new set of 
corporate colors. 
McArthur, supra note 20, at 817 (emphasis added). The argument is unconvincing for 
several reasons. Often the party that obtains the lease from the lessor never develops the 
leased land. The vast majority of leases contain a broad assignment clause, and it is common 
to have the lease assigned several times before it is possessed by the party that ultimately 
develops the leased land. Frequently, the lease will be assigned many times after the 
property is developed. Also, a lessor should not be concerned with a lessee’s downstream 
marketing capabilities when they are expressly limited to a royalty on values at the most 
“upstream” point in the gas marketing chain: “at the well.” In any event, if a lessee is held to 
have an implied marketing obligation, the lessee’s performance will be measured by what a 
hypothetical prudent operator owning the single lease would have done under all the 
circumstances. Jurisprudential Underpinnings, supra note 24, at 10-12 to 10-14 (discussing 
the prudent operator standard). 
 138. This is the real rub that goes to the heart of the “implied-in-law/lessor best-deal” 
analysis versus the “implied-in-fact/what does the contract require” analysis. 
 139. The benefit is derived from the lessee’s ownership of the gas and ability to do things 
with the gas after the lease relationship has run its course regarding the extracted gas. 
 140. McArthur, supra note 20, at 865. The royalty owner’s “share” is often defined as an 
amount of money equal to the market value of the gas “at the well.” 
 141. This contract is the “old” agreement. 
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written; courts seeking to mitigate the express terms of the lease contract 
resort to implied covenants and other interpretive devices to avoid giving 
effect to the contract the parties made. Often this is masked by purporting to 
invoke “oil and gas law” to resolve the issue. 
If you accept the premise that the oil and gas lease is an adhesion 
contract, then it is highly likely that the express terms of the resulting 
bargain—the contract—have been designed to maximize the lessee’s 
interests. Therefore, if a court wants to avoid sticky language like “market 
value” and “at the well,” it will need to employ a theory that gets them 
away from the contract where the court’s interpretive license can operate. 
This is where the law of implied covenants comes into the picture, with 
Professor Merrill as the chief artist. 
It is possible that counsel representing lessors and lessees are missing the 
real issue that drives courts in this area: Is the lease contract at issue in fact 
the product of an unfair bargain?142 For counsel representing lessees in 
Colorado, their task may be to debunk, with evidence at trial, the 
underlying premises used by the Colorado Supreme Court to apply their 
implied-in-law approach to the oil and gas lease.143 The task for counsel 
representing lessors in jurisdictions like Kansas and Texas will be more 
difficult. They will have to prove, with evidence at trial, that an unfair 
bargaining situation existed and resulted in the express lease terms the 
lessee is seeking to enforce.144 
                                                                                                                 
 142. This will present a problem for the class action procedural device since inquiry into 
issues such as unconscionability requires a highly factual lessor-by-lessor analysis. For 
example, there will be a temporal variance in the inquiry because the conscionability of the 
bargain must be evaluated “at the time it was made.” U.C.C., supra note 40, § 2-302(1). It is 
not unusual to encounter leases in a single field, or even a single well, that may have been 
entered into decades apart. Similarly, an unconscionability analysis requires that “the parties 
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, 
purpose and effect.” Id. § 2-302(2). The Restatement contemplates a similar inquiry, “The 
determination that a contract or term is or is not unconscionable is made in light of its 
setting, purpose and effect. Relevant factors include weaknesses in the contracting process 
like those involved in more specific rules as to contractual capacity, fraud, and other 
invalidating causes . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 43, § 208 cmt. 
a. 
 143. The Colorado Supreme Court, like Professor Merrill, bases its interpretation of the 
oil and gas lease on the premise that the “standard” oil and gas lease is unfair to the lessor 
and therefore requires judicial intervention to rewrite the contract to make it fair, or more 
fair. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 899 (Colo. 2001); Jurisprudential 
Underpinnings, supra note 24, at 10-16 to 10-20. 
 144. The Colorado Supreme Court criticizes the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the term “at the well” noting: “the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the lease was 
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“Oil and gas law,” in the vast majority of cases, should merely be a 
chronicle of how contract, property, and tort have been applied to problems 
encountered by the oil and gas industry. An “oil and gas” contract should be 
treated no differently from any other type of contract.145 If a court decides 
to treat it differently, it should explain why. As noted in this article, courts 
that stray from basic contract law principles are often adjusting the contract 
to favor the lessor. However, instead of employing the appropriate contract 
analysis, such as unconscionability, they justify their intervention as the 
application of “oil and gas law.” Currently, oil and gas law is undergoing a 
tug-of-war between those desiring to engage in a broad equitable re-
ordering of the oil and gas bargain146 and those desiring to apply traditional 
contract doctrine to preserve the parties’ private ordering.147 There are 
many in-between that usually end up applying contract doctrine after 
wading through a morass of “oil and gas law.”148 I predict the jurisprudence 
in this area will be significantly improved with a revival of the application 
of basic contract law to oil and gas problems; a revival which some courts 
are pursuing and one I believe will result in a renaissance of law in the law 
of oil and gas. 
                                                                                                                 
not ambiguous, and that the language at issue specifically provided the point of valuation for 
the royalty payments.” Rogers, 29 P.3d at 899 (referring to the Kansas court’s analysis in 
Stemberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995)). However, the Colorado 
Supreme Court also criticized the Colorado Court of Appeals for finding “that the ‘at the 
well’ provisions must be given some meaning.” Rogers, 29 P.3d at 899 (emphasis added). In 
jurisdictions willing to give meaning to the express terms of the contract, the lessor will have 
to establish a legal basis for disregarding the contract, such as unconscionability. If the court 
will not accommodate the lessor through benevolent interpretation, then the lessor will need 
to provide the court with a doctrinal basis for avoiding the express terms of the contract. 
 145. As with any contract, the unique attributes of the industry can be accommodated, 
when appropriate, through interpretive concepts such as “usage” or “usage of trade.” See 
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 43, §§ 219–223. 
 146. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court demonstrated this re-ordering in its 
opinion, Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001). 
 147. For example, the Texas Supreme Court demonstrated traditional contract 
interpretation in its opinion, Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001). 
 148. The Kansas Supreme Court exemplified this approach in its opinions in Stemberger 
v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995) and Smith v. Amoco Production Co., 31 P.3d 
255 (Kan. 2001). 
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